God and Man in the Yale Dormitories by Dorf, Michael C.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
8-1-1998
God and Man in the Yale Dormitories
Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law School, michaeldorf@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dorf, Michael C., "God and Man in the Yale Dormitories" (1998). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 101.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/101
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
at Tue Nov 25 20:33:01 2008
Citation:  84 Va. L. Rev.  1998
From the HeinOnline License Agreement:
Licensees are granted a personal, non-exclusive,  non-transferable, limited license
to access the on-line, electronic archive of journals and other materials provided
by HeinOnline (the 'Database'), and to download or print any portion or portions of
content of the Database ('Materials'), primarily for your own use, according to the 
terms of this Agreement. This license includes: 
(a) The right to electronically display Materials retrieved from the Database on your
    computer terminal;
(b) The right to download Materials by means of the download commands of the HeinOnline
    website and to store a single copy of Materials in a machine-readable form on your
    computer; and
(c) The right to print Materials by means of the printing commands of the HeinOnline 
    website and to create a single print of Materials downloaded by means of the 
    downloading commands of the HeinOnline website.
Except as specifically provided above, you are prohibited from downloading, storing,
reproducing,transmitting, displaying, copying, distributing, or using any portion of the 
Database. Without limiting the preceding sentence, you shall not download or print an 
entire issue or issues of a publication or journal within the Database. You may contact
HeinOnline by telephone or in writing in order to obtain a printed copy of one or more 
entire issues of such a publication or journal subject to payment of any applicable charge.
Other terms apply to this subscription.  See the complete license at heinonline.org.
ESSAY
GOD AND MAN IN THE YALE DORMITORIES
Michael C. Dorfi
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL REASONING
R ELATIVELY early in American constitutional history, Alexis
de Tocqueville observed that "[s]carcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into
a judicial question."' The conventional view counts this fact as a
vice of American political life, because relegating social questions
2to the courts purportedly saps the vitality of popular deliberation.
One might challenge the conventional wisdom by noting something
like the converse of Tocqueville's observation. Legal questions,
especially constitutional ones, tend to catalyze and then shape
public debate about social questions. For example, the Supreme
Court's recent consideration of the constitutionality of laws pro-
hibiting physician-assisted suicide3 moved a simmering public dis-
cussion to the front burner of American politics. 4 In favor of this
"Professor of Law, Columbia University. Versions of this Essay were presented at
the 1997 Georgetown Conference on the Constitution and Civil Society/The Consti-
tution of Civil Society and at a Hofstra University School of Law faculty lunch.
Sherry F. Colb, George Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Lance Liebman, Andrzej Rapac-
zynski, Laurence Tribe, and Jeremy Waldron also provided very helpful comments.
'1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., Knopf
1945) (1835).
* See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 24-25, 33-39,
45 (1987); Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in The Spirit of Liberty: The Papers
and Addresses of Learned Hand 189-90 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960); Robert F.
Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review
1-5(1989).
3 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (rejecting a due process chal-
lenge to Washington's prohibition); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (rejecting
an equal protection challenge to New York's prohibition).
' The phenomenon identified occurs whether the Court denies recognition to an
asserted right, as it did with physician-assisted suicide, or recognizes an asserted right,
as it did with abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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counterview, Ronald Dworkin contends that American courts, as
forums of principle, render debate about divisive social issues
deeper than it is in other Western democracies.5
Dworkin is surely right when he notes that constitutionalization
rarely ends public debate, even or perhaps especially when basic
rights are concerned.' Yet the relation between legal/constitutional
debate and debate about broader social questions is more compli-
cated than either the conventional wisdom or Dworkin's counter-
view indicates. For even if constitutionalization sometimes invigo-
rates public debate, it does so using the categories of constitutional
law, which are not appropriate in all settings.
The basic difficulty is that constitutional law is (and in my view
ought to be) "thinner" than moral and political discourse generally.
According to the liberal tradition that informs so much of our con-
temporary jurisprudence of constitutional rights, the state must be
neutral with respect to competing comprehensive conceptions of
the good. One sees something very much like that Rawlsian for-
mulation throughout the Supreme Court's rights decisions, but
especially in cases involving speech, religion, or both.8 Whether
neutrality is a desirable or even coherent aspiration of constitu-
tional law is a much mooted question9 that I shall not address here.
See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Con-
stitution 30-31, 343-47 (1996). I recently expressed mild skepticism about Dworkin's
claim. See Michael C. Doff, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97
Colum. L. Rev. 133, 177 (1997).
6 See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 345.
See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) (defending a liberal social
order through a hypothetical social contract). Rawls distinguishes between full, or
thick, and thin conceptions of justice. See id. at 395-99.
8 The classic statement is Justice Jackson's, speaking for the Court: "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion ... ." West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see
also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (invoking
the concept of "neutrality" with respect to speech or religion seventeen times in the
course of invalidating a state university's decision not to fund a religious student
newspaper).
9 See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 102-03 (1991);
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L.J.
1373, 1377-78 (1986). For an interesting exchange about the political consequences
and historical context of the critique of neutrality, compare Suzanna Sherry, All
the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the Warren Court, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 459 (1997) (arguing that those seeking substantive neutrality praise
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For even if one assumes that constitutional law can and should as-
pire to neutrality between competing conceptions of the good, it
hardly follows that other actors in other settings ought to do so to
the same degree. 0
In most settings, this point will be obvious enough. For example,
few thinking persons who oppose abortion on moral grounds will
infer from Roe v. Wade" and its progeny that their moral views are
mistaken. They understand that they are entitled to act upon pre-
cisely the sort of comprehensive moral views that, according to the
Court, constitutional law sometimes forbids the government from
acting upon. To be sure, there will be those who, for political or
other ends, deliberately conflate judicially mandated government
neutrality with respect to some practice with judicial approval (or
disapproval) of that practice; but then any view can be distorted in
a variety of ways.
If constitutional doctrine need not significantly affect moral and
political reasoning in settings in which comprehensive moral views
play a large and open role, might constitutional doctrine neverthe-
less have a significant impact on decisionmaking by institutions
that are themselves liberal in the sense that constitutional law is?
For example, it is tempting to think that even though the First
Amendment does not apply to private actors, private universities
ought to adopt First Amendment principles as a matter of univer-
sity policy.12 The principle of free speech, on such a view, is as
much a principle of a liberal education as it is a principle of a lib-
eral democratic society, and thus a jurisprudence developed in the
latter context ought to have something to say about the former.
There is much truth in this view. However, in these pages, I
want to suggest that the categories of constitutional thought must
be used with great care when exported to other contexts, even
the Warren Court and criticize the current Court without recognizing that both Courts
embraced formal neutrality), with Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospec-
tive, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 503 (1997) (responding that those who praised the Warren
Court valued the substantive results, not formal neutrality).
"I Rawls himself made this point at the outset of his project. See Rawls, supra note
7, at S.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"See Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 218 Cal. Rptr. 228, 230 n.3 (Ct.
App. 1985) (upholding the dismissal of a faculty member while noting that the Stan-
ford Faculty Advisory Board voluntarily committed the university to the First Amend-
ment principles that would be applicable to a state school).
1998] 845
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highly liberal contexts like the private nonsectarian university,
which I take as a paradigmatic liberal community. I would point to
at least one important difference between the government as regu-
lator and a liberal private university. The university is a voluntary
association, and while this fact hardly justifies its setting policies on
a take-them-or-leave-them basis-what could be less liberal?-it
does mean that the private university may legitimately affirm a
thicker version of liberalism than is appropriate for a government
that must remain neutral with respect to competing conceptions of
the good. Under a thick or comprehensive liberalism, tolerance,
pluralism, and mutual respect are not merely the background con-
ditions for social cooperation; they are affirmative goods in them-
selves. To the extent that "[a] thick theory... requires substantive
standards for what it is to live well,"'3 these liberal values provide
the standards. A voluntarily constituted institution committed to
thick liberalism may take some coercive measures to ensure that
members of that institution do not lead lives characterized by in-
tolerance or disrespect for other members.
In the free speech area, for example, current constitutional doc-
trine affords regulations of hate-speech no exception to the rule of
content-neutrality. 14 Yet even if we think that this approach re-
flects an appropriately thin conception of liberalism, we might
nonetheless have doubts about applying it to speech codes at more
thickly liberal institutions like private universities.15 I shall exam-
ine the contrast between thick and thin liberalism in the closely
related context of free exercise of religion, for religion, even more
than speech, poses the paradox of how to affirm liberal values for
the benefit of those who reject liberalism. 6
,,Thomas Morawetz, Persons Without History: Liberal Theory and Human Expe-
rience, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 1013, 1020 (1986).
14 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
"The doctrine would need to be significantly modified to take account of the dif-
ferent institutional context. For a concise statement of a view I find attractive, see
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 687,772-75 (1997).
16 See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church
and State, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2332 (1997) (arguing that the conflict is irreconcil-
able); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581, 584
(1993) (arguing that the refusal to accommodate fundamentalist intolerance by elimi-
nating tolerance is itself intolerance).
846 [Vol. 84:843
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II. THE YALE FOUR
Unless they are married or over 21 years old, freshmen and
sophomores at Yale College must live in the dormitories. 7 A group
of Orthodox Jewish Yale students object to the policy." They find
the climate of lax sexual morality that prevails in the dormitories to
be inconsistent with their religious beliefs, and prefer to live off-
campus. 9 Yale refuses to make an exception to its housing policy
for these students, who have styled themselves the "Yale Four."
Thus far, a negotiated resolution has not been forthcoming. The
Yale Four filed a lawsuit,21 which the district judge dismissed; the
students plan to appeal.2
For reasons that will become apparent, I believe that the district
court ruling will be upheld on appeal. However, my primary inter-
est is not the legal question as such, but the question whether the
familiar categories of legal and constitutional thought help us re-
solve the policy question: What should Yale College do? I shall,
therefore, concoct a version of the Yale Four controversy that pre-
sents a difficult normative question, and then examine whether the
available legal tools are adequate to the task of answering it.
The actual facts of the case raise two interesting, but for my pur-
poses, distracting, issues. First, in one sense the case is only about
money. Yale College does not actually insist that the students live
in the dormitories-just that they pay the bill for the dormitory
rooms.23 The College justifies nonenforcement on the ground that
directly enforcing the residence policy would unduly intrude on
17 See William Glaberson, Five Orthodox Jews Spur Moral Debate over Housing
Rules at Yale, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1997, at 45.
18 See id.
'
9 See id.
,,The original group included five members, styling itself "the Yale Five." Devon
Spurgeon, 5 Jewish Students Want Release from Yale Dorms, Wash. Post, Sept. 29,
1997, at A8. Before filing suit, one of the students married, thus becoming exempt
from the housing requirement on that basis. See id.
21 See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College, No. 3:97CV02212 (D. Conn.
filed Oct. 15, 1997); Nicole Itano, Lawsuit Draws Little Support from Student Body,
Yale Daily News Online, Oct. 31, 1997 (visited May 23, 1998) <http://www.yale.edu/
ydn/paper/10.31.97/t-2support.html>.
-See Judge Dismisses Jewish Students' Lawsuit on Yale Housing Policy, Wash.
Post, Aug. 9, 1998, at A5.
23 See Glaberson, supra note 17.
1998] 847
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students' privacy.24 Yale does have a generally valid interest in re-
specting student privacy in this way, but the privacy interest does
not seem to be implicated where, as here, students openly declare
that they are not living in the dormitories. Yale's willingness to ac-
cept the students' money regardless of where they actually live
tends to undermine Yale's claim that the residence requirement
serves important educational, as opposed to financial, objectives.
On the other hand, the fact that the students can buy their way out
of the residence requirement also diminishes the degree to which
the Yale policy infringes upon their religious liberty. Let us there-
fore assume that Yale actually insists that the students occupy the
dormitory rooms (and that enforcement as to these students raises
no significant issues of privacy or selective enforcement).
Second, the nature of the Yale Four's religious objection is some-
what murky. As I understand it, Orthodox Jewish law imposes sex-
ual modesty obligations and forbids premarital sexual contact as
well as other forms of physical contact between men and women.25
It is unclear how the dormitory residence requirement violates any
of these obligations. There exist Yale dormitory rooms that are sex
segregated by floor, and Yale College has expressed willingness to
put in place policies that ensure that bathrooms are sex segregated
while used by the Orthodox students.6 Thus, the risk of unwanted
physical contact seems minimal. It is true that the Orthodox stu-
dents might see their classmates in states of immodest dress, but
that is also true outside of the dormitories. Perhaps there is a
greater risk of accidental visual encounters with the partners of
sexually active roommates, although here too, one can easily imag-
ine that roommates would take simple measures, such as closing
bedroom doors or posting warnings, to avoid this risk. The princi-
pal objection of the Orthodox students appears to be that they do
24 See Spurgeon, supra note 20.
2See Yitzhak Buxbaum, Jewish Spiritual Practices 590 (1990) (describing obliga-
tions designed "to stop the force of the sexual urge before it gathers strength," in-
cluding "avoiding contact with members of the opposite sex, and avoiding things that
arouse sexual desires and thoughts"). The injunctions relate to temptation, rather
than association for its own sake. Thus a debate among Jewish authorities about
whether it is permissible to sleep with another man focuses on the likelihood of ho-
mosexual acts actually occurring. See Basil F. Herring, Jewish Ethics and Halakhah
for Our Time: Sources and Commentary 189-92 (1984).
26 See Glaberson, supra note 17; Itano, supra note 21.
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not want to condone the "anything goes" lifestyle of their class-
mates.27 That objection-while clearly related to the religious be-
lief system of the Orthodox students-is not a religious objection in
the strict sense. Thus, to simplify matters, I shall assume that the
Orthodox students are bound by a religious injunction of the form,
"Thou shalt not share living space with persons engaged in pre-
marital sex."'
Even with the above counterfactual assumptions in place, the
case seems like an easy legal victory for Yale under federal law.
First, although Yale receives considerable government funds and
the state of Connecticut plays some formal role in Yale's govern-
ance, Yale probably is not a state actor. Second, the essence of
the Yale Four's complaint is that Yale fails to grant them a relig-
ious exemption from its general policy.3" Under current law, even
if Yale were deemed to be an organ of the state, its conduct would
not give rise to a constitutional claim.31 But the constitutional law
on this point is, to say the least, in flux, and therefore worth exam-
ining more closely.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
From the 1960s through 1990, Supreme Court doctrine pur-
ported to say that a generally applicable law would be subject to
strict scrutiny if it imposed a substantial burden on religious free-
dom.32 (I say purported because the doctrine had important excep-
tions and there are real questions as to whether, even absent one of
the exceptions, the test meant what it said.33) In 1990, in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, the Court distinguished most of the earlier
21 See Elisha Dov Hack, College Life vs. My Moral Code, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1997,
at A27.
I'  relax the assumption below, infra Part V.
2) See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43 (1982).
- Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1, Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Col-
lege, No. 3:97CV02212 (D. Conn. filed Oct. 15, 1997) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
-1 See infra Part III.
-" See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,403-07 (1963).
"See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and
Religious Liberty after City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 98-101; Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 323,352-53.
- 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
1998] 849
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cases and held that the Free Exercise Clause usually does not re-
quire exemptions from generally applicable laws 5 Congress re-
sponded in 1993 with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act3
("RFRA"), imposing, as a matter of statutory law, strict scrutiny of
all laws substantially burdening free exercise.37 Then in 1997, in
City of Boerne v. Flores,38 the Court held RFRA invalid (at least as
applied to the states) as beyond Congress's power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 However, several dissenting
Justices stated that they were eager to reexamine Smith,n4 raising
the possibility that within a decade, federal law will have gone from
purportedly requiring religious exemptions to not requiring them,
back to requiring them, then back again to not requiring them, and
finally to requiring them again.
I have argued elsewhere against the decision in Smith and in fa-
vor of a RFRA-type regime as a matter of constitutional law.41
Rather than restate the argument here, I will offer a brief response
to what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of the Smith
approach. In Smith and its nineteenth century precursor, Reynolds
v. United States,42 the Court disavowed a program of religious ex-
emptions on the ground that to grant such exemptions would allow
every person "'to become a law unto himself."' This fear seems
overstated for at least four reasons.
First, many laws continue to operate satisfactorily even if exemp-
tions are granted. For example, over two decades of experience
prior to Smith (including an opera-buffa version of Smith itself)
3. See id. at 878-82.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)).
3742 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
33 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
39 See id. at 2172.
See id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined in large part by Breyer, J., dis-
senting); id. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
41 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, On Reading the Constitution 93-95
(1991); Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 1175, 1210-19 (1996).
,2 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
,3 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
,4See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting de-
fendant's claim that she was a member of the Neo-American Church-headed by
Chief Boo Hoo and having the motto, "'Victory over Horseshit"'-and thus required
by her faith to ingest as well as distribute marijuana and LSD, because defendant
failed to present "evidence of a belief in a supreme being, a religious discipline, a
850 [Vol. 84:843
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belie any serious worry about litigants flooding the courts with spu-
rious religious freedom challenges to the drug laws.
Second, many of the floats in the Smith parade of horribles45 can
be readily deflated by the compelling interest test. Must we allow
consensual human sacrifice as an exception to the homicide law?
The short answer is of course not. As I discuss below, the compel-
ling interest test may be problematic in principle, but in practice
there is no plausible alternative that is more sympathetic to relig-
ious freedom claims, and applying the test to the reductio ad absur-
dum cases readily yields the proper result.
Third, even in some hard cases, the compelling interest test has
the salutary effect of focusing political attention on oppressive but
constitutional laws. Consider Reynolds, which involved a claimed
religious exemption from a polygamy prohibition.46 What interest
do polygamy prohibitions serve? Those of us who have argued for
sexual freedom or sexual orientation equality have often encoun-
tered the objection that if our claim were to prevail then polygamy
laws would also be unconstitutional, a result assumed to be self-
evidently absurd. In response, we typically attempt to distinguish
polygamy by arguing that it is inherently coercive or that its social
meaning is the subjugation of women (or perhaps men in the case
of polyandry). But before resorting to arguments from false con-
sciousness to distinguish polygamy, we might pause to wonder why
those on the other side of the sexual liberty or equality question
invoke the practice. 47 I suspect that they cite polygamy, consensual
nonprocreative adult sibling incest, and other taboos precisely be-
cause they know that laws prohibiting these practices in fact serve
no valid purpose, and they also know that our leading constitu-
tional organs will be unwilling to say so. RFRA-type regimes force
the government to articulate the interests our laws serve, at least
in the religion context. If the most that can be said on behalf of a
law is that it furthers an interest in conventional morality, the law
would likely fail RFRA-type scrutiny. To be sure, the law would
still be valid in other contexts, because an interest in morality,
ritual, or tenets to guide one's daily existence," thus making it "clear that the desire
to use drugs and to enjoy drugs for their own sake" was the organizing principle of
the Church).
45 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
41 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
41 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1998]
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simpliciter, is generally valid as a matter of constitutional law.4 As
a matter of politics, however, something like the harm principle
(the requirement that a law be designed to prevent harm to persons
other than the actor) 49 has broad public appeal, such that public ac-
knowledgment that a law serves no interest other than enforcing
a particular moral vision may undermine political support for the
law-a desirable end, in my view.
Fourth, granting religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws does not obligate the state to grant exemptions on other, non-
religious grounds.5 To begin with an easy case, the desire to attend
a football game hardly warrants the same degree of solicitude as
the religious obligation to avoid laboring on the Sabbath. There
are, to be sure, harder cases: a (nonreligious) moral obligation to
care for a sick relative or not to participate in an unjust war, for ex-
ample. If one were designing a constitution, one might well con-
clude that exemptions ought to be granted in such circumstances
under a general principle of freedom of conscience. But that does
not mean that there is no principled basis for distinguishing relig-
ious from nonreligious claims. Religious obligations are obliga-
tions to submit to the norms of what Robert Cover called a nomic
community-a community that is a source of norms for its mem-
bers."' On this view, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
recognize the dominion of another sovereign. 52 This dimension of
plural sovereignty is absent in the case of claims based on an indi-
vidual's moral or other nonreligious grounds for objecting to a
generally applicable law.53
4 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
49 For a defense of the harm principle, see 4 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing at ix-xx, 318-38 (1988).
51 In City of Boerne, only Justice Stevens understood RFRA to be constitutionally
problematic on the ground that it privileged religious claims. See City of Boerne, 117
S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
- See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4-5, 24-33 (1983).
12 See id. at 32 n.94. I do not wish to imply that the nomic character of religion is
the only plausible ground for supporting religious liberty, while giving less protection
for nonreligious moral autonomy. One might, for example, attempt to justify a spe-
cial place for religious liberty on the ground that religion is a good thing. See John
H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 275 (1996).
13 But cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L.
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Hence, under what I consider the correct, RFRA-type, approach,
if Yale were a state actor, the Free Exercise Clause would require
that the application of Yale's dormitory residence requirement to
the Yale Four satisfy strict scrutiny. As I argue below, it would
likely fail this test. Because Yale is probably not a state actor, how-
ever, the Yale Four's constitutional claim would fail, even under
RFRA's relatively expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause.:
4
Given my view that the best understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause would require a state university to grant the Yale Four an
exemption, I might be expected to favor that result as a matter of
policy. In fact I do, but I consider the question much more difficult
than the analogous constitutional question that would face a state
institution.
IV. A LIBERAL EDUCATION
If one were deeply committed to the values of a liberal educa-
tion, on what grounds might one justify denying the Yale Four an
exemption? We can immediately dispose of a very bad, albeit
quite common argument against an exemption. The bad argument
is that the students knew about Yale's policy when they applied,
they could have applied elsewhere, and thus they are estopped
from complaining now.5 Unless tied to some account of the educa-
tional objective of the dormitory residence requirement, this argu-
ment proves far too much. Suppose Yale scheduled examinations
on Saturdays and the Orthodox students, in order to observe the
Rev. 1245, 1291-97 (1994) (arguing for treating religious and other claims of con-
science equally). Eisgruber and Sager make a powerful argument for the proposition
that, viewed in individual terms, some nonreligious claims for exemptions are at least
as strong as religious claims. See id. I too would probably favor accommodations for
such claims on the basis of an unenumerated or penumbral right of freedom of con-
science, but in doing so I would recognize that such a right lacks the additional, sov-
ereignty-based support that is present in the context of claims of religious freedom.
"The complaint includes additional claims, some of which may have merit, al-
though others, such as allegations that Yale is engaged in "tying" in violation of the
Sherman Act and that Yale violates the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by forcing
them to witness sexual offenses and somehow blocking their reporting of these
crimes, may well be sanctionable as frivolous. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at
$$ 7, 82-83, 133-38, Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale College, No. 3:97CV02212
(D. Conn. filed Oct. 15, 1997) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
1 The district court relied on this argument in dismissing the Yale Four's case.
See Judge Dismisses Jewish Students' Lawsuit on Yale Housing Policy, supra note 22,
at AS.
1998] 853
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Jewish Sabbath, wanted to be able to take theirs on another day.
Would the fact that there are other fine colleges that do not sched-
ule Saturday exams by itself justify Yale's refusal to make an ex-
ception? It seems fairly clear that the answer is no, unless the Yale
administration has some good reason for thinking that granting ex-
emptions (or even changing the schedule for everyone) would un-
dermine some important aspect of Yale's mission. If Yale's policy
amounts to a gratuitous infringement of the students' religious
rights, the students should not be taken to have waived their rights
simply by enrolling in Yale College.
Thus Yale should have to proffer some legitimate educational
objective for refusing to grant the Yale Four an exemption from
the policy. As an initial step, we ought to understand what purpose
the policy serves in general. The Yale College Administration be-
lieves that students learn as much or more from one another in
their dormitories as they do from their professors in class. 56 In-
deed, Yale does not merely require residence in dormitories, but in
residential colleges, centers of academic and social life designed to
involve students in an intimate community without isolating them
from the university as a whole.57 Yale seeks an intellectually, geo-
graphically, culturally, ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse
student body in no small part because the ability to respect and un-
derstand persons of very different backgrounds is an essential
component of a modern liberal education. To opt out of the dor-
mitory residence requirement is to opt out of a Yale education, be-
cause the principles Yale seeks to foster can be grasped only by
living them.
These are powerful ideals, although, if the controversy were to
arise at a state institution such as the University of Virginia, and
were RFRA or its equivalent still controlling, the ideals would not
be sufficient to override the countervailing religious claim. The51
enduring significance of Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of
56 See Samuel G. Freedman, Yeshivish at Yale, N.Y. Times Mag., May 24, 1998, at
32, 34 (quoting Yale President Richard Levin as saying that "we believe the under-
graduate experience is more than just the classroom).
17 See Josh Benton et al., Yale's Residential Colleges are More than Random
Dorms-They're a Way of Life, Yale Herald Online, Summer 1997 (visited Mar. 29,
1998) <http://www.yale.edu/herald/archive/xxiii7.8.97/frosh97/rescol.html>.
s 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Sisters,59 and, Smith notwithstanding, Wisconsin v. Yoder," is that
the state may not seek to standardize its citizens, especially not if
they have religious objections to the particular form of standardiza-
tion.61 Each of these cases involved children, as to whom the state
has an arguably greater interest in inculcating citizenship values. A
fortiori, the state cannot (outside the military) insist on standardi-
zation as the price of a quality college education. Under my view
of the Free Exercise Clause, the "UVA Four" ought to prevail.
Does the fact that a state institution should-under my view of
the Free Exercise Clause-be required to grant religious exemp-
tions from a dormitory residence mean that, as a matter of internal
governance, Yale should grant exemptions? That answer does not
obviously follow, unless we believe that the state action doctrine is
a mere technical requirement of a legal claim. In my view, how-
ever, the state action doctrine rests at least partly on the claim that
some objectives that are permissible or even laudable for private
institutions are forbidden if undertaken by the government.
There is a critical difference between Yale and a state university
(or more broadly, the state in all of its capacities). The education
at institutions like Yale is appropriately thicker-i.e., contains more
elements of a comprehensive moral view-than any official view-
point that the state may legitimately foster through coercive means.
As a private, voluntarily constituted community of scholars dedi-
cated to principles of mutual respect amidst diversity, Yale does
not present the grim specter of a latter-day Sparta. 2 This is not to
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
'°406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Smith itself, the Court unconvincingly distinguished Yo-
der on the ground that the case "involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with ... the right of parents.., to direct the
education of their children." Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
11 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-34; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-
02; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 785-87
(1989) (explaining Meyer and Pierce as standing for an anti-totalitarian principle).
2To be sure, a dormitory residence requirement not subject to exemptions at the
University of Virginia or some other prestigious public university would not neces-
sarily present such a specter either. Indeed, given the large governmental role in
funding nominally private universities and the role of private money (through tui-
tion, donations, and endowment) in funding nominally public ones, the line be-
tween public and private universities may often be difficult to draw. However, once
a court concludes that an institution falls on the public side of the line, First Amend-
ment norms apply. In some ways, the university context gives those norms added
force. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592, 603-10 (1967) (holding
1998] 855
Virginia Law Review
say that Yale's argument for collective life is convincing, only that
it should not be ruled out as bad policy simply because we would
want to deem the same policy unconstitutional if undertaken by a
state institution.
V. RESOLUTION
Yale's refusal to grant the Yale Four an exemption serves two
complementary purposes. First, Yale might worry on behalf of it-
self that granting religious exemptions would establish a principle
that, taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to the granting of
other exemptions, eventually undermining the coherence of Yale's
conception of itself as a pluralistic community. Second, Yale might
worry on behalf of the Yale Four themselves that the exemption
would so dilute the experience of a Yale education as not to war-
rant the name. Both sets of concerns are legitimate, but in my
view, neither quite justifies the failure to grant an exemption.
Whether Yale's fear of a slippery slope is justified is partly a
question of numbers. One can readily imagine that some very re-
ligious Christians and Muslims would seek exemptions on grounds
similar to those sought by the Yale Four, and if they did, surely Yale
would have to treat them all the same. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to believe that more than a fairly small number of the students who
choose to attend Yale would in fact seek religious exemptions.
Columbia College, for example, enrolls many more Orthodox
Jewish students than Yale College and also has a dormitory resi-
dence requirement. Columbia's requirement, however, is subject
to religious exemptions; yet very few Orthodox students actually
seek exemptions. In any event, should Yale become flooded with
applications for religious exemptions from its dormitory residence
unconstitutional, on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, the application of a state
prohibition on "subversive" employees to the faculty at a state university). In other
ways, the educational mission may afford a state university more autonomy than
would be appropriate for other state actors. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (treating the university's First Amendment interest in di-
versity of viewpoints as compelling for equal protection purposes). In any event,
constitutional norms do not apply to private actors, and, as I argue in the remainder
of this essay, that is appropriate, notwithstanding that Yale and UVA obviously have
much more in common than either has in common with, say, a two-year technical
college, whether the latter is nominally public or private.
63 See Interview with Orthodox Rabbi Charles Sheer, Jewish Chaplain of Columbia
University, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 7, 1997).
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policy, it would at that point become appropriate and possible to
consider denying exemptions.
Yale might also worry that granting religious exemptions would
open the door to exemptions for students who wish to self-segregate
on other grounds. For example, Dartmouth College gives students
the option of "affinity housing," special dormitories for those in-
terested in participating in various cultures. 64 Although one could
justify Dartmouth's approach to pluralism on liberal grounds, there
are also strong liberal arguments for the Yale approach. According
to one Dartmouth student, affinity housing has "facilitated... sepa-
ratism on campus."6' If one thought that granting the Yale Four a
religious exemption would oblige Yale to facilitate other forms of
separatism, that would count as a strong reason to deny the Yale
Four an exemption. However, for the same reason that RFRA-
type regimes legitimately treat religious claims as special, Yale
could grant religious exemptions without incurring an obligation to
grant exemptions on other, potentially more troubling, grounds.
Thus, in my view, Yale's concern that granting the Yale Four an
exemption would undermine the overall character of a Yale educa-
tion is not, at this time, persuasive. What about Yale's concern
for the welfare of the Yale Foiir themselves? Quite apart from
the minimal impact on the rest of the Yale community, do the Yale
Four rob themselves of so much that is valuable in a Yale educa-
tion as to warrant a decision by Yale to override their religious claim
as a condition of membership in the Yale community? To gain
insight into this question, consider a variation on Yale's policy.
Suppose that, in addition to the dormitory residence require-
ment, freshmen and sophomores were required to eat together in
the collective dining hall. Let us suppose further that the dining
hall serves non-kosher food, so that Orthodox students observing
14 See Office of Residential Life, Dartmouth College, Special Residential Programs
(visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http'//wvw.dartmouth.edu/-orl/affinity.html>. Dartmouth of-
fers separate housing arrangements for those interested in African and African-
American, Asian, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Jewish, Latino, Native
American, Russian, or Spanish language and culture. See id.
, Adam J. Siegel, Letter to the Editor, Folly of Separatism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11,
1997, at A30.
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kashrut are forbidden by their religious scruples from eating in the
dining hall. 6 What sort of accommodations should Yale make?
Some very observant students would object to eating in the com-
mon dining hall at all, even if they were permitted to have kosher
food prepared and served separately. In order to offer the collec-
tive prayer for grace after meals and to ensure kashrut, they might
feel a need for completely separate facilities. This clash looks very
much like the actual clash over the dormitory policy, at least as-
suming that we accept the claim that Yale's interest in fostering
community through common dining is of roughly the same strength
as its interest in fostering community through common housing.
There will, however, be students who observe kashrut but do not
object to eating their separately prepared meals in the common
dining area. Would Yale have an interest in requiring them none-
theless to eat non-kosher food as a condition of a Yale education?
The argument seems far-fetched. Would it have seemed that way
half a century ago, when Ivy League colleges admitted only a hand-
ful of Jews, and then only the most assimilated? 67
Under a RFRA-type regime, we would attempt to resolve the
actual dispute or the dining-hall variant by asking whether some
compelling interest of the larger community can be achieved only
by overriding the individual's religious obligation. However, the
thicker liberalism of the university views the individual's end of the
bargain somewhat differently. Just as we would sometimes de-
mand accommodation by the university, we would also look for
signs of accommodation by the individual. The students who are
willing to eat in the common dining hall may affirmatively wish to
participate in the life of the community to the maximum extent
permitted by their religion, and thus we feel sympathy for their
plight not only as subjects of the community norms but as members
of the community. Because they seem willing to accommodate the
mainstream, we feel an obligation to meet them halfway.
1 In fact, "Yale allows students to use their meal plan in the kosher cafeteria of a
privately financed Jewish center." Freedman, supra note 56, at 32.
61 For a vivid account of anti-Semitism in Dartmouth College admissions during the
1930s and 1940s, see William H. Honan, Dartmouth Reveals Anti-Semitic Past, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 11, 1997, at A16 (reporting remarks of Dartmouth President James 0.
Freedman, who also observed that "it was the same at Harvard and Yale").
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But is it fair to ask members of a religious minority to bend their
religious principles? Is not the real difference between the students
who want kosher food but are willing to eat it in the dining hall and
those who insist on eating apart, that the two groups have different
religious beliefs? I want to resist this perspective by suggesting that
a feature of the constitutional law of religion distorts our analysis.
Under a RFRA-type regime, the predicate for subjecting to strict
scrutiny the government's failure to grant an exemption is the
finding that the claimant has a sincere religious belief." The focus
is understandable. Because we do not want secular courts to make
religious determinations, we do not ask them to inquire into the
"truth" of religious beliefs. Sincerity, however, oversimplifies the
nature of religious belief by suggesting that it is something fixed:
Either the claimant has a religious belief that conflicts with a secu-
lar obligation or she does not. In fact, most individuals' religious
beliefs are more complicated.69
In one sense, religious liberty does not fit well within the liberal
conception of the autonomous self that freely chooses its ends and
means. To feel a religious obligation is to feel that one has no
choice but to comply. Indeed, some critics of liberalism use the
example of religious obligation to cast doubt on the liberal concep-
tion of the self." Nonetheless, our culture's strong aversion to co-
ercing people to comply with religious obligations suggests that the
right to religious freedom is at least partly a right to choose
whether and how to be religious.7' Within a faith, individuals make
choices about how religious to be. And even in the case of persons
who accept the authority of some religious official, they typically
choose which particular minister, imam, rabbi, priest, or doctrine"
to follow. (In the case of, say, the Catholic Church, which assigns
See, e.g., Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997).
, See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the question whether a person holds a particular religious belief often
cannot be answered yes or no).
1OSee Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy 65 (1996).
1, See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (rejecting
a reading of the Free Exercise Clause that would give less protection to religious con-
verts than to those who had adhered to the same faith since beginning employment).
7 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (finding that the fact that
an individual's view of his religious obligations differs from that of other members of
a sect does not disqualify the belief as religious in nature).
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parish membership based on residence, individuals may choose
where to live partly on this basis, or they may work within their
parish to be assigned a priest who fits their community's style.) In
substantial measure, religious beliefs, like other important matters
of belief, are formed and re-formed in negotiation with the world.
Our legal system often attempts to ignore this fact, treating re-
ligious beliefs as simply given. Even if this is the correct approach
for the law to take, the liberal private university should be permit-
ted to take a more realistic view of religious belief-i.e., it should
be permitted to view religious obligations as somewhat negotiable
in the same way that other beliefs are. To be sure, negotiations
ought to be conducted with the utmost respect for individuals' re-
ligious beliefs, but exposing students to new ways of thinking and
living is the very essence of a liberal education, and students who
wish to opt out of reexamining their beliefs, including their relig-
ious beliefs, really do seek to opt out of a liberal education.
What makes the case of the Yale Four truly difficult as a policy
matter is their ambiguous relationship to the ideals of a liberal
education. Recall that in order to make sense of the Yale Four's
claim for a religious exemption, I hypothesized a religious prohibi-
tion on sharing living space with persons engaged in premarital sex.
However, to the extent that the students' quest for an exemption
actually stems from a more generalized unwillingness to treat per-
sons they deem sinners as equal members of the Yale community,
they reject an obligation of membership in that comprehensively
liberal institution.
This is not to say that offensiveness ought never to be a legiti-
mate basis for opting out of some element of a liberal education.
For example, even if the principle of academic freedom entitles a
professor of evolutionary biology to espouse male superiority in
the classroom, it hardly follows that students majoring in biology
should be required to take his class. On the whole, however, a com-
prehensively liberal institution should limit the occasions on which
offensiveness provides an adequate basis for nonparticipation in
communal life-especially when the equal status of other commu-
nity members is the source of offense. Thus, if the dormitory resi-
dence requirement merely makes the Yale Four feel offended or
uncomfortable, Yale would be justified in denying their exemption.
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The Yale Four's objection probably combines elements of of-
fense, discomfort, and religiosity if not strict religious obligation.
Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to look for signs of ac-
commodation and flexibility on the part of the Yale Four. Such
signs exist, although they are obscured by the fact that in order to
make their argument more persuasive as a legal claim, the Yale
Four have chosen to portray their religious obligations as utterly
nonnegotiable. Yet the fact that they seek a Yale education at all
reflects a significant degree of flexibility and willingness to engage
a pluralist community, as we can see by contrasting the Yale Four
with some Orthodox Jewish sects that insist on virtually complete
isolation.73 The Yale Four's portrayal of themselves as strictly
bound by religious law may be necessary to obtain relief from a
court, but Yale ought to recognize that underneath the rhetoric of
absolute religious obligation, these students were willing to come
to Yale because they were willing to risk exposing themselves to a
liberal education. If it is at all possible to give them that education
without requiring them to live in dormitories-as I believe it is-
Yale would best carry out its thickly liberal mission by doing so.
VI. STATE ACTION REDUX
My conclusion that Yale ought to exempt the Yale Four from
its housing requirement appears to harmonize the result I favor as
a policy matter for Yale with the result I would favor as a consti-
tutional matter in a similar case at a state institution. But this
congruence is deceptive. For although I would applaud the Su-
preme Court's (re-)assertion of a RFRA-type approach to claims
71 Consider the description of a community of Satmar Hasidim in Board of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994):
The residents of Kiryas Joel are vigorously religious people who make few con-
cessions to the modern world and go to great lengths to avoid assimilation into
it. They interpret the Torah strictly; segregate the sexes outside the home;
speak Yiddish as their primary language; eschew television, radio, and Eng-
lish-language publications; and dress in distinctive ways that include headcov-
erings and special garments for boys and modest dresses for girls. Children are
educated in private religious schools, most boys at the United Talmudic Acad-
emy where they receive a thorough grounding in the Torah and limited expo-
sure to secular subjects, and most girls at Bais Rochel, an affiliated school with
a curriculum designed to prepare girls for their roles as wives and mothers.
Id. at 691.
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for religious exemptions, I would not favor legislation requiring
private actors like Yale to grant religious exemptions. Recall that
the Yale Four case is more difficult than the same case at a com-
parable state institution such as the University of Virginia because
Yale is entitled to enforce a more comprehensive, thus more con-
troversial, conception of the good than the state may enforce. This
would make application of the compelling interest test to Yale
problematic-because an interest that is compelling within Yale's
comprehensive liberalism might not be compelling as measured by
the more dilute standards of public reason generally. Similarly, if
Yale places a higher value on a particular conception of mutual re-
spect than does the society generally, a policy that is the least re-
strictive means of achieving Yale's conception might be deemed
overly restrictive from the broader social one.
The very sorts of reasons that underlie the validity of claims for
religious autonomy against the state counsel against requiring an
institution like Yale to grant religious exemptions: Private universi-
ties, like religions, are appropriately treated as nomic institutions.
For government to mandate a RFRA-type regime for a nomic insti-
tution like Yale would be to deny the institution's nomic character.
In short, although I believe that Yale ought to grant exemptions as
a matter of its own comprehensively liberal principles, I do not be-
lieve that it ought to be required to do so as a matter of law. On
the other hand, I believe that the best interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause would require a state institution to grant religious
exemptions under otherwise identical circumstances.
Yet it appears perverse that I would, in principle, allow Yale
greater freedom to define itself at the expense of its students than I
would allow a state university. For Yale is not just any old nomic
community. It is one of a handful of institutions that serve as gate-
keepers for the political, economic, and social elite. Exclusion
from colleges like Yale can mean exclusion from the halls of
power. And inclusion at the price of religious assimilation may be
the practical equivalent of exclusion for some members of religious
minority groups.
We might be tempted to respond to this objection by noting
that it proves too much. Large numbers of people are, as a prac-
tical matter, already excluded from the privileges that go with a
Yale education by their inability to pay. Moreover, many of those
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who might just barely be able to afford to attend Yale through a
combination of grants and loans are screened out by selection
mechanisms that correlate strongly with wealth.74 Yet, surely this
injustice (if that is what it is), does not justify the unrelated injus-
tice of requiring religious assimilation as the price of admission.
My position that Yale ought to have the legal right to include
dormitory residence as an essential element of its community
norms-even though I believe that this policy reflects a mistaken
interpretation of Yale's own mission-requires me to walk a tight-
rope. Because Yale is not merely some nomic community on the
fringes of American life, I cannot dismiss exclusion from Yale as
irrelevant to American citizenship. On the other hand, Yale is not
the only gatekeeper college in the country. The alternative of go-
ing to another Ivy League or comparable college may be largely
irrelevant to Yale's own internal assessment of its residence policy,
but that does not mean it should be irrelevant to society's assess-
ment of whether Yale should be permitted to make the determina-
tion for itself.
The relevance of alternatives to an external assessment of the
permissibility of a housing policy like Yale's suggests that alterna-
tives might also be relevant in an assessment of what should be le-
gally permissible for a state university system. I noted earlier that
under the RFRA-type analysis I favor, a state university should be
required to grant religious exemptions from a mandatory dormi-
tory residence requirement. Suppose, however, that a single state
university system includes one campus, call it "East," with a dormi-
tory residence requirement and another campus, call it "West,"
without such a requirement. Is it a sufficient answer to a religious
student who wishes to live off-campus while attending East that at-
tendance at West is available? There are reasons why the answer
might be no. Certainly, if there are elements of East's academic
program that are unavailable at West, or are of inferior quality, or
if West is a very great distance from East, attendance at West is not
an adequate substitute for attendance at East.
Let us, therefore, stipulate that West is an adequate substitute
for East in every way that we deem important. Might we none-
74 See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 987-92 (1996).
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theless demand that the student be permitted an exemption from
East's policy? If East had an explicit rule forbidding Orthodox
Jews to attend, the fact that Orthodox Jews could attend West
would be unavailing. That would be a rather clear-cut case of im-
permissible segregation. Does it make a difference that in my hy-
pothetical example, the segregation results from a failure to grant
religious exemptions rather than an explicit religious classification?
I am uncertain how to answer this last question. I am certain,
however, that, under the assumptions stated above, the govern-
ment's case for denying an exemption at East is considerably
stronger than its case for explicit exclusion. We might be tempted
to analogize the difference to the legal distinction between de
jure and de facto discrimination.75 But I think this is a misleading
analogy. One can be critical of the doctrinal distinction between
de jure and de facto discrimination and the closely related distinc-
tion between purposeful discrimination and disparate impact,76 as I
am, yet still think that perhaps the state is justified in offering West
as an alternative to East. In both the de jure and the de facto seg-
regation and discrimination cases, excluded persons claim a right to
be treated the same as everyone else-to attend the same schools
or to hold the same jobs-while a claim for a religious exemption
is, by definition, a demand to be treated differently. In both the ac-
tual Yale case and in my hypothetical case of students who wish to
attend East campus, the students seek a form of separatism. Short
of abolishing the general policy entirely, there is no way to accom-
modate them that does not involve an alternative. The religious
students can attend East while missing out on dormitory life, or
they can attend West and be treated like everybody else at West,
but the one thing they cannot do is attend East and be treated like
everybody else at East.
Thinking about the state university version of the Yale Four
drama shows that the Court was not entirely wrong in Smith.
75 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745-47 (1974) (holding that federal courts
may not impose a remedy for de jure urban racial segregation on suburban school
districts that were not directly responsible for that segregation, even though suburban
districts were de facto segregated).
76See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976) (holding that, absent
showing of purposeful discrimination, disparate racial impact does not violate equal
protection).
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Smith and City of Boerne correctly assume that, other things being
equal, overt discrimination on the basis of religion is more perni-
cious than failure to grant a religious exemption from a general
policy not itself directed at religion. The trouble with Smith is not
its assumption that overt hostility to religion is worse than indiffer-
ence to religious obligations; the trouble is Smith's assumption that
indifference is invariably permissible.
VII. THE LIMITS OF NOMIC AUTONOMY
I began this Essay by noting how our thinking about constitu-
tional issues shades our thinking about nongovernmental institu-
tions that face some of the same issues. We have just seen that
thinking about the nongovernmental institutions can shed light
back upon the constitutional questions. But to say that analysis in
these different spheres has common features is not to say it must
be identical. Thus, we should be careful about imposing quasi-
constitutional norms on nongovernmental nomic communities.
Indeed, even the application of straightforward prohibitions on
overt discrimination to the private sphere can raise difficult ques-
tions. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids private col-
leges that receive federal funds from discriminating on the basis
of race, color, or national origin,77 and the statute could easily be
amended to cover religion. Moreover, although it has not exercised
the power, under the Commerce Clause, Congress probably could
prohibit even private colleges that do not receive federal funds
from discriminating on the basis of religion or other suspect
grounds.5 Suppose that upon losing its legal battle against admit-
ting women,79 the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") had decided
77See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
,,,The case for the constitutionality of such a statute would be strongest if supported
by congressional findings that discrimination in college admissions and other deci-
sions have a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Heart of At-
lanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964). Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach would seem to be closer analo-
gies than United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), even though Lopez nominally
dealt with education. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. Moreover, given the size and broad
public function of most colleges, a claim that such a statute infringed on freedom of
association would likely fail. See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537, 54547 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-22 (1984).
71 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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to "go private," foregoing state and federal funds. Assuming gov-
ernmental power to prohibit sex discrimination, would it have been
wise policy to exercise that power?
There is, I think, an easy answer to the question whether we ought
to extend our nondiscrimination norms to all private conduct: We
should not. Concern about forced association is the basis for the
Fair Housing Act's exemption for some owner-occupied housing,"
and even those who have their doubts about that particular exemp-
tion would, I think, object to a legal norm that forbade racial or re-
ligious discrimination in the choice of, say, a spouse."'
Of course, the hypothetical privatized VMI could not claim im-
munity from antidiscrimination laws on the grounds that choosing
to attend VMI is identical to choosing a spouse. Instead, VMI's
claim would be that the ability to constitute itself as an all-male in-
stitution is, from the perspective of VMI, essential to its nomic self-
definition. To be sure, the Supreme Court rejected that claim in
the equal protection context,8 but the Court did not-could not-
view the matter from VMI's internal perspective.
What if the institution seeking an exemption from the antidis-
crimination norm is itself a religious one? The closest case in the
Supreme Court, Bob Jones University v. United States,3 involved
the tax-exempt status of a religiously oriented university that pro-
hibited interracial dating and marriage. The Court sustained the
Internal Revenue Service's determination that' such an institution
was not "charitable" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code, because of the public policy against racial segregation. 
4
Suppose that Congress or a state legislature were to extend its
general antidiscrimination laws to a church and not merely a re-
ligiously affiliated university." Surely the only justification for
s'42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1994).
8 But cf. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Ra-
cial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 Yale L.J. 875, 943-47
(1998) (proposing that state-funded adoption agencies disregard adoptive parents'
racial preferences).
2 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279-82.
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
See id. at 585-602.
e In Bob Jones, the Court found that a compelling interest in combating racial seg-
regation in higher education justified the burden placed on the religiously affiliated
university. See id. at 602-04. Note that under Smith, the university's claim would be
866 [Vol. 84:843
Yale Dormitories
exempting a church from laws prohibiting race or sex discrimina-
tion while failing to exempt churches from, say, laws prohibiting
homicide or kidnapping, would be a judgment that antidiscrimina-
tion laws are less important than prohibitions on homicide and
kidnapping."6
Once again, we seem to be stuck with something like the com-
pelling interest test. Yet whether the question is one of constitu-
tional law, public policy, or institutional self-governance, posing
the question of how to treat the minority "other" as one of com-
pelling interests leads to the same familiar problem. Inevitably, we
evaluate the relative strengths of the interests from the majority's
viewpoint. But the whole point of recognizing the autonomy of the
individual or the quasi-sovereignty of nomic communities is that
we recognize a limitation of the jurisdictional hegemony of major-
ity norms.
What is to be done? We are not prepared to accept everything
done in the name of a nomic community's sovereignty. For exam-
ple, we would not (I hope) exempt cadets at the hypothetical pri-
vate VMI from criminal or civil liability for brutal batteries on the
ground that this is understood as permissible hazing within the
college's distinct nomos. More controversially perhaps, I am also
prepared to say that some forms of inequality or subordination are
sufficiently pernicious to justify the society as a whole overriding
the claims of nomic communities, but even those who draw a line
at physical harm must recognize that in doing so they prefer the
sovereignty of the whole community to that of a subset or off-
shoot. And what this tells us is that although the liberalism of the
whole community is thinner than the thick liberalism of an institu-
tion like Yale, it is not dimensionless. Even thin liberalism is a
value system.
weaker still, as the IRS policy denies tax exempt status to all segregationist universi-
ties, without singling out religious ones. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
81 Exempting religious organizations from the prohibition on discriminating on the
basis of religion stands on a different footing from an exemption from other antidis-
crimination norms. Thus, religious organizations are exempt from Title VII's prohi-
bition on religious discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994);
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (rejecting an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to the application of the exemption to employees performing nonreligious, al-
beit nonprofit, activities).
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Liberals should not try to deny this undeniable fact." They-
we-should recognize that the neutrality of which we commonly
speak is not nihilism or radical skepticism. It is instead a mecha-
nism for achieving certain substantive conceptions of human dig-
nity, liberty, and equality.
CONCLUSION
Although I have described the Yale Four controversy as a diffi-
cult case, as religious accommodation cases go, it is fairly easy.
The Yale Four's objective does not directly challenge deeply cher-
ished ideals of the general society (or even of Yale) in the same
way that, for example, a claim for a religious exemption from a
prohibition on polygamy would. Majority institutions are most
willing to accommodate minority religious practices that do not
challenge deeply held beliefs of the collectivity. In contrast, truly
dissident religious beliefs cannot be accommodated in the conven-
tional sense of making an exception that leaves the general rule
untouched.88 This is obvious in cases where the dissident belief re-
quires an accommodation of a clearly oppressive sort: for example,
public endorsement of a sectarian view, accompanied by persecu-
tion of infidels. But in some sense, all religious (or other) exemp-
tions from general rules challenge the general practice by calling
into question the validity of the shared social norm. Some ques-
tions of religious accommodation are so difficult because they pose
a choice of competing paradoxes: suppress the freedom to be dif-
ferent in the name of a diverse community, or facilitate separatism
in the name of a community of mutual respect.
It should be clear that the compelling interest test does not re-
solve the paradoxes. By whose standard do we answer the ques-
tion whether the mainstream institution pursues a compelling in-
terest? Certainly not the dissident's. By the dissident's standard,
the religious obligation takes precedence. It appears, therefore,
that the compelling interest test rules out little more than gratui-
tous homogenization, but allows suppression of the dissident
" 
87See Dorf, supra note 41, at 165.
Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 629 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (describing,
for Establishment Clause purposes, an accommodation of religion as the lifting of "a
discernible burden on the free exercise of religion").
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whenever the judiciary shares a political majority's belief that some
objective is compelling.
Requests for religious accommodation pose a challenge for the
imagination: Can the mainstream institution grant full "citizenship"
to the other, accept the other's differences, recognize that this ac-
ceptance changes the conception of the institution at the margins,
and still maintain its core institutional integrity? Sometimes the
answer will be no, as the discussion of VMI and the Bob Jones case
suggests.
More often, however, I suspect that our mainstream institutions
err in the other direction. Smith itself is an obvious example. The
Court characterizes as neutral a system of law that criminalizes
(ritual or other) peyote use while permitting (ritual or other) alco-
hol consumption. This seems a failure of empathy."
Can Yale remain true to its pluralist principles while permitting
its Orthodox students to opt out of the dormitory component of the
Yale program? If remaining true means retaining the principles in
unchanged form, the answer is no. But let us not forget that as a
Yale principle, pluralism itself is of relatively recent vintage. So
too, pluralism is a relatively recent principle of the American civic
religion. As our social and government institutions confront plu-
ralism's paradoxes, pluralism itself will inevitably be transformed
by experience.
, Smith is not the only example of the Court treating illegal drugs as dramatically
different from legal ones. For example, during an oral argument a year and a half
after the decision in Smith, one Justice expressed the view that cigarette use is a ma-
lum prohibitum, while cocaine use is a malum in se. See United States Supreme
Court Official Transcript at 9, United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (No. 90-
1124), available in 1991 WL 636288; cf. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 15-7, at 1326 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that such attitudes are unsurprising, given
the marginalization of those who use illegal drugs, regardless of whether they are in
fact more harmful than legal ones).
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